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If Professor Hershey's treatise were judged solely on its text, it could
only be described as an elementary manual on international relations. The main
rules of the law of nations and the usages of international intercourse are indeed
stated, but the statement is mingled with a strong dash of ethical and sociological material. This extra-legal commentary is carried out with an admirable
impartiality-no book could be more completely free from any distortion by
national prejudice-but a work which sets out to be a scientific disquisition on
law is hardly the place for it. Some of the most striking irrelevancies occur
in the discussion of the causes of war. What, for example, has the jurist to
do with birth control as a remedy for those economic necessities which may
culminate in hostilities?
The book opens with a reproduction of the most widely accepted doctrines
of the 19th century as to the nature and sources of international law. Professor
Hershey does not concern himself with the fundamental re-examination and
criticism of these doctrines so actively in progress at this moment in Europe.
There is no reference, in the rich bibliography furnished by the notes, to the
work of the Viennese School, if we may so describe Kelsen, Verdross and their
disciples. This is the more regrettable in that Professor Hershey shows greater
familiarity than is usual in Anglo-Saxon treatises with the theories of earlier
Germanic publicists, and might have been expected to interpret to his public the
philosophy of their successors.
After a sketch of the history of international relations-an able and instructive synthesis of far more substance than is commonly offered the studentthe book proceeds to the analysis of the existing international system. The
treatment here is again conventional and for the most part thoroughly sound.
One or two rather startling illogicalities meet the eye, however. After deciding with scanty attention to the difficult question as to the position of pirates,
inhabitants of occupied territory, neutral shippers, etc., that individuals are
objects, not subjects, of the law of nations, the author announces, on page 267,
that "we shall consider the rights and duties of individualsas objects' of international law.

.

.

."

Again, we are told on page 175 that the Sovereign

State is "fully autonomous and independent, i. e., relatively' free from higher
or outside control." This sort of lapse, easy as it is to avoid, mars the most
convincing presentation.
Professor Hershey's voluminous notes serve a triple purpose. They provide an invaluable bibliography, illustrate the rules set out in the text and bring
the book up to date. If the text is that of an elementary manual, the notes will
Italics mine.
Italics mine.
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repay the attention of the most advanced student. Unfortunately, the misprints are legion, and there are two errors in regard to the mandate system
which cannot escape notice. It is not accurate to say (p. 191, note 37) that
the League has delegated its supervisory powers to the Mandates Commission.
That body is purely advisory, without power to make decisions binding on the
mandatories or even to make direct recommendations. Nor are the countries
under C mandate "recognised as integral portions of the territory of the mandatories" (p. 19o, note 36). That would be a recognition of annexation, a very
different thing from the right to administer "under the laws of the Mandatory
as integral portions of its territory." (Article 22 of the Covenant.) It is no
more than just to add that to condense so great a mass of material into such
limited space without some minor inaccuracies would savour of the miraculous.
P. E. Corbett.
McGill University Law School.

COMMUNITY

PROPERTY LAW IN CONTACT WrrH FEEn.AL ESTATE TAXATION.

By Richard C. Burnett.
PP. v, 43.

Published by the author, San Francisco, 1927.

This little book is a monograph in the form of an attorney's brief which
challenges the view that the husband in California is the owner of the community property and that the wife is an heir to one-half thereof when she survives her husband and so must pay a federal inheritance tax.
It is unfortunate that the book is in the form of a brief because: it will not
be read in the same way that a book without this ulterior purpose would be;
if the writer were not under the necessity of making out his case he would have
given a more accurate and detailed discussion of some of the difficulties in his
way; he would not feel constrained to cite "Cyc." and Ruling Case Law .as
authorities but rather would use them for what they are--glorified digests.
The book is valuable as well for its discussion of inheritance taxation as
for its treatment of the nature of community property. The reviewer, however, sees no advantage in classifying inheritance taxation into strict inheritance taxation and quasi inheritance taxation. Why not just say that in the
case of wills, the presence of a consideration does not prevent the imposition
of such a tax? One misses a citation in Part V to the well-known case United
States v. Perkins' where the distinction is made between the privilege of transmitting property after death and the privilege of receiving property on the
death of another. But in that case the state tax was called a transfer tax.
As respects the onerous character of the wife's acquisition of an interest
in community property, the author might have found some comfort in In re
Schnioll1 which he does not cite. There the succession to property in New
York was governed by the community law of a canton of Switzerland. By
antenuptial agreement of the spouses, two-thirds of the financial gains were to
163 U. S. 625 (1896).
App. Div. 435, i8I N. Y. Supp. 542 (1920).
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go to the survivor and the other one-third to their issue. Marriage in California should accomplish a similar result as to the spouses.
This reviewer believes that the author makes his case when he argues that
the wife takes by onerous title rather than gratuitously. But the California doctrine, despite that fact, is no more unfair than the common law doctrine that
the wife's earnings belong to the husband. The arguments advanced by the
learned author should have led the California Supreme Court long ago to the
adoption of a theory different than the one adopted whereby the husband owns
the community property during the continuance of the marriage. It disagrees
with the views of the courts in probably all of the other community property
states. But the California court has spoken and what can you do about it?
The reviewer does not feel convinced by the author's arguments that dower
and community rights may coexist and that they are not inconsistent with each
other. Neither does it seem to him that the community interests of the spouses,
whatever they may be, are severable during the marriage as he thinks the
learned author implies. Neither the husband nor the wife has any particular
one-half interest during the marriage.
Neither does it seem that the author has had much success in working out
five different theories as to the nature of the wife's interest in California.
How does a vested future interest differ from a vested present interest? In
neither case does the wife have possession or management except in the limited
situation where, while living apart from her husband, she may manage her own
and her children's earnings. Nor does the learned author seem justified in
dignifying with the word "theories" the variations in expression, and call them
the "Contingent Future Interest Theory," the "Non-Interest-Plain Theory",
and the "Non-Interest-Heirship Theory." A present non-interest may be consistent with a future contingent interest.
The author presents a good case for the widow to the effect that she
should not be regarded as an heir. Her interest in California, however, is apparently not unlike the forced-heir in Louisiana. She must take and the husband cannot prevent it. This argument ought to have appealed long ago to the
California court, but it did not.
If, in fact, the community property belongs to the husband during marriage,
and she survives him, she takes as a forced heir. If the marriage is dissolved
by divorce, at common law so to speak, the husband must pay alimony. So
here he divides the acquisitions because the law so requires. That probably
does not prevent him from being the owner during the marriage though it seems
true that the power of control has been confused with the right of ownership.
The author's thesis would be sound if the court had not already held differently.
Her interest was acquired onerously and not gratuitously.
On the whole this is a useful little book both for the discussion of inheritance taxation and for the added light it throws on the nature of community
property. It probably will not be persuasive so far as California is concerned
because of the doctrine of stare "decisisin that State. It is unlikely that the
federal courts will change their views until the California Supreme Court holds
that the wife has a present vested interest in the community gains.
Alvin E. Evans.
University of Kentucky Law School.
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By Clark and Marshall. 3d Ed. by Judson A. Crane.
Callaghan & Co., Chicago, x9"27. Pp. lxix, 794.
This work was originally published in two volumes in 19oo. A second edition in one volume by H. B. Lazell appeared in 19o5. The purpose of the
present editor is to bring the second edition down to date. Some changes are
indicated generally in the preface to this edition but to discover them in the
text requires a comparison of the editions as no method of indicating changes
is used.
The plan of the book is to deal first with the problems common to crimes
generally and then take up the treatment of the specific offenses. The concluding chapter deals with jurisdiction.
The cases in the notes are arranged alphabetically by states and parallel
citations are given including citations to the first edition of Beale's Cases on
Criminal Law and the second edition of Mikell's Cases on Criminal Law.
The classification of crimes in the original edition was based on Blackstone and divided crimes into those against individuals, property and habitation,
and those especially affecting the commonwealth. In the present edition the
classification has been made according to the interest immediately involved.
Crimes against individuals are classified as to those against the individual's
interest in the integrity of his person; interest in freedom of locomotion; interest in the domestic relation, etc. The effectiveness of any classification must
be measured by its purpose. No reasons are given for the changes made and
since the treatment of the crimes involved follows the outline used in the old
edition, one can only presume that the new classification was made because the
word interest-public, social, economic, or what not-is not much in vogue.
In discussing criminal intent in statutory crimes the usual statement is
made that in certain cases "criminal intent is conclusively presumed," when all
that is meant is that no intent is necessary. It is to be regretted that a text-book
would continue to use the "let's play like" phrase of "conclusive presumption"
When the cases cited in support of it clearly state that no intent is necessary.
For example, State v. Southern Ry. Co.,cited in § 42 n. 21, says: "If there
is anything well settled by the decisions of this Court, it is that, wherever an
act is denounced as unlawful by statute, the doing of that act constitutes the
offense, and the intent with which the act is done is immaterial."
In going over rather full notes made in reading the book, the reviewer finds
most of them merely indicate a desire for fuller treatment. For instance,
insanity is given a conventional treatment without much consideration of the
adequacy of the tests used or whether they agree with modern medical knowledge. The treatment of consent is meager with no discussion of whether it is
looked on subjectively or objectively. There is very little discussiqn of the
nature of possession, whether it has any mental characteristics and whether custody can thus be logically distinguished from possession.
The physical make-up and printing are good. There are some errors in
proof-reading which, however, is not unusual. In several places one note refers
to another by number and the reference number will be the one used in the
earlier edition; since the note numbers in the present edition have been changed,
THE LAW OF CRImES.

1122 N. C. 1052 (1898).
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the note referred to will be found to have nothing to do with the matter under
discussion. For example, §359 (c) note 451, refers to note 441 post which
should read 452; § 396 note 721, refers to note 704 infra which should read 725.
As a whole this book has an advantage over the encyclopedia since all of
the matter is treated together. Any one desiring a concise statement of the law
of crimes would make no mistake in purchasing this volume.
It is seldom one sits down and deliberately reads a general text on crimes
from cover to cover but it is a good experience. All of the senseless technicalities and quibbles are brought home in a short space of time. One can but hope
that the proposed investigation by the Legal Research Committee of the Commonwealth Fund into "the socio-psychological implications underlying criminal
law

.

.

.

and a comparison of these concepts with the modem view in the

fields of sociology, psychiatry, and psychology" will be the forerunner of a
work on Criminal Law comparable to Dean Wigmore's work on Evidence.
A. B. Cox.
Tudane University Law School.
CASES ON BUSINESS LAW.

By Leslie J. Ayer. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York,

1927. Pp. 480.

Professor Ayer's most recent edition of his "Cases on Business Law" is a
reaffirmation of his allegiance to the theory that law is taught most successfully
through the case system. Not only does he hold to this belief in regard to the
instruction of future members of the bar, but also in regard to the undergraduate business student. In his former contention, Professor Ayer is in accord
with the theories and practices of the leading legal pedagogues and institutions
of this country. In the latter, the proponents of the text and lecture systems
are more numerous, and since armed with more impressive arguments, more
formidable.
Although there is no occasion for entering into an extended examination
of the arguments on either side of this moot point, it is interesting to consider
this case-book in the light cast by two fundamental criticisms of the case system. Proponents of the text system admit that studying cases acquaints the
future barrister with the sources of the law to which he will have occasion to
refer again and again during his legal career. In addition, it necessitates clear,
synthetic legal reasoning, a practice invaluable to an attorney. On the other
hand, it is contended that the need of the student of business methods is a
deeply imbedded and sharply defined conception of the few elementary principles of the law that the average business man is likely to utilize in his everyday commercial transactions. Texts achieve this result, while case-books,
with their opposing arguments, dissenting opinions and confusing dicta, produce
only a blurred and indistinct impression.
The author anticipates the objection that the purposes and needs of the
law and business students differ, for he says in the preface that "It may be
remarked briefly that the same law exists for both." Even his opponents would
not deny the truth of such a statement while, however, pointing out that it considers the problem objectively only, that the factor of the student himself is
completely ignored. A far stronger position is taken in the statements that
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the case-book "develops his (the student's) capacity for grasping and analyzing
important legal problems" and that "an introductory course
. . should be
so adapted that every student in the college or university could profitably take
the same." Professor Ayer seems to suggest that a primary purpose of the
introductory law course is the training of the student in such legal reasoning as
has been termed invaluable to the practitioner. If this be his position, has he
not, by such counter-attack, when defense was expected, imposed on his adversaries a considerable task of remarshalling their arguments before they may
re-enter the contest?
The second objection to the use of case-books in business law courses loses
much of its force when directed at collections like the one under examination.
Stated metaphorically, the dissenters contend that a text is a line drawing, so
smoothly portraying the subject matter that the youngest may comprehend and
say "It is a horse." The case-book, on the other hand, is a mosaic, the irregularities of which leave so much to the imagination that only one who is devoting
his life to the subject, having attained the proper perspective, may discern the
equine resemblance. Professor Ayer has been notably successful in selecting
and shaping his cases, to the end that matter extraneous and confusing is
avoided. In addition, he has placed between the cases short excerpts from
texts, notes concerning sources for more extensive study, suggestive questions
and hypothetical cases. As a result, the book presents to the student a pattern
decidedly less difficult to follow than does the average case-book.
As is true of most books designed for introductory courses in business law,
the subject-matter infringes on many other fields than the primary one-contracts. So imposing is the list of associated topics dealt with, including parts
of agency, sales, negotiable instruments, property, evidence, damages, quasicontracts, torts, bankruptcy and decedents' estates, that it strongly resembles
the statement of a law school curriculum. As examples of the exhaustive nature
of Professor Ayer's book, a chapter has been devoted to remedies for interference with contractual relationships and nineteen pages are occupied with the
parol evidence rule. Such a treatment, while eminently satisfactory from an
academic point of view, would seemingly require rather drastic deletion to
bring it within the temporal confines of the average undergraduate course.
John R. Abersold.
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
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